SUPREME COURT, U. S.

FILED
DEC 7 1971
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1971

No. 71-748

MORTON PAUL KANE and MARTIN SKLAROFF,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

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TOPICAL INDEX

	Page
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Question Presented for Review	2
Constitutional Provisions Involved	2
Statement of the Case	3
Reasons for Granting the Writ	5
The Decision Below Conflicts With the Decisions of Other Courts of Appeals as to the Proper Interpretation of This Court's Holding in Alderman v. United States	5
A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Not Following the Disclosure Rule of Alderman	5
B. The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That the Government's Refusal to Disclose Was Not Violative of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution	7
Conclusion	8
Appendix. Opinion of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit (September 30, 1971)	App. p. 1
Opinion of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit (November 8, 1971)	App. p. 17
Order	App. p. 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases	Page
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)	2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) at 182	6, 7, 8
Kane v. United States, 409 F.2d 847 (5 Cir. 1969)	1, 3
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)	7
United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d 20 (10 Cir. 1970)	6, 7

Statutes

United States Code	
18 U.S.C §1084 (1966)	4, 6
18 U.S.C §1952 (1970)	4
28 U.S.C. §1254(1)	2

United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment	2, 7
Fifth Amendment	2, 7, 8
Sixth Amendment	2, 3, 7, 8

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Petitioner Morton Paul Kane respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding on September 30, 1971.

Opinion Below.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in the Appendix hereto. The opinion rendered by the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, unreported, appears in the Appendix hereto. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, *Kane v. United States*, 409 F.2d 847 (5 Cir. 1969) is also included in the Appendix hereto. Petitioner was originally convicted upon trial by jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and no opinion exists with respect to that conviction.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was entered on September 30, 1971. A timely petition for rehearing *en banc* was denied on November 8, 1971, and this petition for certiorari was filed within 30 days of that date. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

Question Presented for Review.

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the decisions of this Court in *Alderman v. United States*, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and sets a confusing precedent for the administration of the rules laid down in *Alderman* by lower courts? This question sublimes the issue:

Whether transcriptions of recorded conversations must be disclosed to a defendant, when the Government is unable to ascertain to whom the conversation belongs?

Constitutional Provisions Involved.

This case involves the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the pertinent texts of which are as follows:

Amendment IV:

> The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .

Amendment V:

> No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . .

Amendment VI:

> In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. . . .

Statement of the Case.

In 1961 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service began a massive five-year investigation of gambling operations in the Miami, Florida, area. As part of this inquiry, the premises of certain suspected gamblers were placed under a form of electronic surveillance, known as "bugging." Petitioner Morton Paul Kane's conversations were monitored on the bugged premises of others. The Government admitted that the buggings were illegal. The Government was unable to identify to whom all illegally intercepted conversations belonged, and to those the Government made the designation "unknown male."

Petitioner Kane sought disclosures of the transcription of these "unknown male" recorded conversations. The Government opposed the request at a redemand hearing, said hearing being based purportedly pursuant to *Alderman v. United States*, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) as ordered in *Kane v. United States*, 409 F.2d 847 (5 Cir. 1969).

In opposition to this discovery request the Government argued that logs containing "unknown" voices could not yield evidence against Petitioner Kane or, alternatively, that Kane did not have the requisite standing to demand production of such "unknown" voice logs. The prosecutor summed up the Government's position by stating:

> "[W]e have submitted all the logs to which we have any reason to believe the Defendants have standing."

With this the trial court denied the motion to produce, notwithstanding Petitioner's specific contention that the logs should have been made available for his inspection to determine standing (whether the "unknown voice" was his) and therefore relevancy in order to eliminate tainted evidence from his trial process. The trial court indicated it was able to make such a determination *in camera*.

Thereby, Petitioner Kane was stripped of his quest to determine standing, which was a condition precedent to establishing relevancy to the issue of taint.

After the hearing, the trial court determined that the evidence utilized to convict Petitioner Kane was not tainted by illegal electronic surveillance, and reimposed judgment of conviction and sentence. Petitioner Kane was sentenced to concurrent five-year terms based on his conviction by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 22, 1967, for violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1952 (1970) [conducting gambling-connected telephone communications between Miami, Florida, and Louisville, Kentucky] and conspiracy to violate Section 1952 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1084 (1966) [transmission of bets and wagers by a wire communication facility in interstate commerce].

The adjudication rendered by the District Court against Petitioner was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that to have permitted Petitioner the opportunity to inspect the "unknown male" logs would have granted Petitioner the right to rummage through the Government's files, a procedure unacceptable to the Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS AS TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THIS COURT'S HOLDING IN ALDERMAN v. UNITED STATES.

A. The Court of Appeals Erred in Not Following the Disclosure Rule of Alderman.

Because of the great scope and mobility permitted by "bugging," coupled with intergovernmental dissemination of information obtained therefrom, dangers are ever present to the individual's privacy as it concerns his right to converse freely with another. That maxim was recognized in *Alderman v. United States,* when this Court established a proceeding to resolve whether evidence against a conversant grew out of the conversant's illegally overheard conversations. Therein it was held that in order to pierce the veil of the Government's admittedly illegal behavior, the Government must turn over to the conversant all surveillance records to which he was a party. The rationale for this mandate of direct inspection by an aggrieved party, rather than having an intermediary (court or prosecutor making a determination as to standing or relevancy) make the findings is that only the aggrieved person could winnow relevance or materiality, as well as standing where there is a governmental finding of "unknown voice" since:

> "[A]n apparently innocent phrase, a chance remark, a reference to what appears to be a neutral person or event, *the identity of a caller* or the individual on the other end of a telephone, or even the manners of speaking or using words . . ." 394 U.S. at 182 (emphasis supplied).

In reliance upon what it conceived to be the principles established in *Alderman,* the Fifth Circuit has here held that *Alderman's* "outer limits" would prohibit

the Petitioner access to the Government records to establish that his voice was that which is now unknown. The Fifth Circuit, notwithstanding its recognition that the Petitioner cannot meet the burden of proving taint without inspection of the logs themselves, has further held that to permit an inspection of the "unknown party" voices by the Petitioner would effectively divest the court of its specifically established prerogative of determining standing.

In so holding, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow the interpretation afforded *Alderman*, by the Tenth Circuit in *United States v. Alderisio*, 424 F.2d 20 (10 Cir. 1970). Therein, the Tenth Circuit remanded the cause for a determination as to whether the Government has disclosed all extant surveillance materials. The Fifth Circuit herein has characterized the issue in *Alderisio* as being one of "completeness" and concludes in the case at bar that no issue of "completeness" exists.

It is clear that there is an issue of "completeness" in the instant case, and that the Fifth Circuit's holding that the district judge should rule on questions of standing *in camera*, before the Petitioner is allowed to determine relevancy, creates such an issue. There is "incompleteness" when the court refuses Petitioner the right to inspect the logs of "unknown voices" in order to determine standing. Without such an inspection the Petitioner is unable to meet his burden of showing relevancy.

Alderman specifically provides the answer to the "completeness" issue in recognizing that only the aggrieved person, the Petitioner, is able to win now "the identity of a caller." 394 U.S. at 182.

These conflicts, with this Court's clear holding in *Alderman*, and the Tenth Circuit's rationale in *Alderisio*, justify the grant of certiorari to review the judgment below.

B. The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That the Government's Refusal to Disclose Was Not Violative of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Both courts below decided the novel and important issue that Petitioner was not entitled to disclosure of the logs relating to "unknown voices," and by so doing effectively eschewed Petitioner's constitutional guarantees as contemplated in *Alderman*.

The Fourth Amendment has meaningful application in Petitioner's request, since only Petitioner, without aid of judicial *in camera* or prosecutorial determination can effectively protect his right to be secure in his person. Petitioner's words and voice are protected only if complete disclosure of the same is made, thereby enabling Petitioner to suppress the fruits of unreasonable searches and seizures. See *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

To hold, as did the courts below, that Petitioner's "argument has plausibility," when Petitioner urged that the burden upon them to show "taint" without disclosure of the "unknown voices" denies Petitioner due process by freighting him with an impossible requirement, is tantamount to an admission of error on their parts. The Fifth Amendment was designed and promulgated to afford Petitioner due process protection in a criminal proceeding. The court's fear of permitting inspection which would enable Petitioner access to certain limited logs, to wit: those containing reference to "unknown voices," does not unduly burden the Gov-

ernment, nor does it divest the court of any prerogatives as set forth in *Alderman*. Rather, to permit such discovery is precisely what *Alderman* mandates.

To forbid disclosure of "unknown voice" logs also, and perhaps most importantly emasculates an additional safeguard of the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner is deprived of knowing whether he is a witness against himself.

Closely related to the foregoing witness concept is the Sixth Amendment's process requirement for obtaining witnesses in Petitioner's favor and being confronted with the same. Certainly such process contemplates Petitioner having access to his own conversations, which are in themselves constitutionally protected.

This Court should grant review to affirm the historic principles of our jurisprudence that an accused in a criminal proceeding shall be afforded a balanced measure of safeguards without harm to governmental interests.

Conclusion.

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

OSCAR B. GOODMAN,

Counsel for Petitioner,

Morton Paul Kane.

December 6, 1971.

APPENDIX.

Opinion of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit.

In the United States Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Morton Paul Kane and Martin Sklaroff, Defendants-Appellants. No. 29200.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

(September 30, 1971).

Before BELL, THORNBERRY and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge: Morton Paul Kane and Martin Sklaroff were convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 22, 1967, of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (1970) [conducting gambling-connected telephone communications between Miami, Florida and Louisville, Kentucky], and of conspiracy to violate § 1952 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (1966) [transmission of bets and wagers by a wire communication facility in interstate commerce]. Kane was sentenced to concurrent five-year terms; Sklaroff was sentenced to concurrent two-year terms. On appeal, this Court, without reaching the merits, vacated the judgments and sentences and remanded the cause for further proceedings in light of *Alderman v. United States,* 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). *Kane v. United States,* 409 F.2d 847 (5*th* Cir. 1969).

Pursuant to our mandate, the district court conducted an *Alderman* hearing and at its conclusion determined that the evidence utilized to convict the defendants was not tainted by illegal electronic surveillance.

After the judgments of conviction and the sentences were reimposed, Kane and Sklaroff moved for new trials. The district court refused to pass on these motions on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to hear a motion for a new trial on this remand. The pending second appeal presents for decision the issues raised by the *Alderman* hearing, the seven original issues, and two additional issues on the merits not raised in the original request for review.[1]

THE *ALDERMAN* HEARING

In 1961 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Internal Revenue Service began a massive five-year investigation of gambling operations in the Miami, Florida area. As a part of this in depth inquiry, the premises of certain suspected gamblers were placed under a form of electronic surveillance, known in the vernacular as "bugging". This involved placing microphone gear in the premises which would pick up and transmit words spoken there. No attachments were made to any telephones, therefore, only the conversation of the persons on the premises were overheard or recorded. The evidence reveals that no surveillance was intended to be made of either Kane or Sklaroff directly, rather they happened to be parties to conversations monitored on the bugged premises of Frank Rosenthal and Edward McGrath. The Government admits that these buggings were illegal; the question for the court below in the *Alderman* hearing was whether the evidence gathered by these illegal listening devices tainted the convictions of Kane and Sklaroff.

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[1]A third defendant, Gilbert Lee Beckley, was involved in the original appeal and was similarly resentenced on remand. His appeal from such resentencing was dismissed in a prior order. His rights are not involved here.

Prior to the hearing, at the direction of the court, the Government made available to the defendants transcriptions of recorded conversations, called logs, in which the defendants were known to have been overheard. The Government also furnished logs to the defendants which disclosed instances where no words of either defendant were known to have been overheard but where one of the defendants may have been the party on the other end of the telephone. All other logs obtained by monitoring the Rosenthal and McGrath premises which were arguably relevant to this case, but not furnished to the defendants, were turned over to the trial judge for an *in camera* determination as to whether the Government had furnished all logs to the defendants as they had any right to review under the standards of *Alderman*. In addition to having such of the logs as were made available to them at the hearing to demonstrate taint, the defendants were allowed to question three FBI agents and one former agent who had gathered evidence for this prosecution, to determine whether their information as to defendants' activities came from electronic surveillance records or from independent, untainted sources.

During the course of the hearing the defendants moved to require the Government to produce additional items from its files. Their requests covered an administrative review file, such of the logs examined *in camera* by the court as contained references to "unknown" voices, physical surveillance notes of the FBI, and its interoffice memoranda called airtels. In opposition to this discovery the Government argued that no administrative review file had ever existed; that logs containing "unknown" voices could not possibly have yielded evidence that was used against the defendants or, alternatively, that the defendants did not have the

requisite standing to demand the production of such "unknown" voice logs; and that the production of surveillance notes or airtels would be extremely burdensome to the Government, would be useless to the defendants, would constitute rummaging through Government files, and would go beyond the requirements of *Alderman*. The trial court denied the defendants' discovery motion in toto, based on the findings set out in the margin.[2]

On the present appeal Kane and Sklaroff specifically contend that the logs examined *in camera* should have been made available to the defendants for their inspection to determine relevancy, and the district court should have granted their motion for discovery of the additional government documents.

a. *In Camera* Procedures

In order to establish a right to review illegally recorded government records under *Alderman*, the proof must show that the conversation contained the individ-

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[2] 1. Defendants claim no standing to any premises.

2. Defendants claim no standing to any specific additional conversations.

3. Mere presence on electronically surveilled premises, without more, affords no standing. *United States v. Cavello*, 410 F.2d 563 (2 Cir. 1969).

4. The United States delivered to this Court all extant recordings or transcriptions of recordings of electronic installations disclosed in its pre-trial memorandum which the Court has examined, *in camera*, and determined that the United States has furnished defendants all recordings and transcriptions of conversations to which defendants have standing. *Taglianetti v. United States*, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).

5. The United States has no additional logs reflecting the presence of either of the defendants on premises which were subject to electronic installations.

6. There are no inter-office memoranda among the various agents reflecting additional electronic monitoring to which defendants have standing.

7. None of the Government's evidence supporting the convictions of defendants herein was the product of elec-

ual's own voice or that the eavesdropping occurred on the individual's own premises. A voice whose identity is not known to the listening party does not, without more, establish standing on behalf of any person. A defendant who proposes to establish that he has standing to obtain a recording containing the voice of an unknown person has the burden of producing evidence that would indicate to the judge making the *in camera* review that he is the unknown party whose conversation has been monitored, or that the recording came from his premises. The defendants here failed to produce such evidence. They argue that placing such a burden upon them denies due process by freighting them with an impossible requirement—one they cannot meet without an inspection of the logs themselves. Certainly this argument has plausibility if considered solely from the defendants' point of view. It is easy to conjecture that if they had full access to all government records they might, by knowing the time,

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tronic surveillance reflected in the records furnished defendants. Further, nothing appears in defendants' motions, memoranda, or testimonial evidence to indicate any such taint.

8. The recordings of the *Bubis* telephone conversations admitted in evidence at the trial were not the product of illegal electronic monitoring. *Hanna v. United States,* 393 F.2d 700, 404 F.2d 405 (5 Cir. 1969), cert. den. 394 U.S. 1015 (1969). There is no evidence that the recordings were the product of electronic monitoring of a defendant herein for an "unreasonable" length of time and, therefore, illegal. On the contrary, the case relied upon by defendants held that such monitoring by the telephone company for only the days here involved would have been "reasonable" and legal. *Bubis v. United States,* 384 F.2d 643 (9 Cir. 1967).

9. Defendants are not entitled under *Alderman v. United States, supra,* to disclosure of notes on physical surveillances conducted by Government agents.

10. The convictions of defendants were not tainted by the use of any evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveillance.

place and content of certain logs which appear innocuous, establish that their voices were those which are now unknown. However, we read *Alderman's* definition of standing as prescribing the outer limits of a defendant's right to view illegal wiretaps. To follow the defendants' entreaties in this case would push us beyond those outer limits.[2a] If their assertions were honored, the defendants would effectively divest the court of its specifically established prerogative of determining standing.

As explicated in *Taglianetti v. United States*, 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969), the problem in *Alderman* was that the in camera procedures described there were inadequate to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. However, these holdings make it explicitly clear that *Alderman* did not rule all *in camera* proceedings deficient.[3] Here the *in camera* proceedings did not entail the difficulties found compelling in *Alderman*. The record developed below demonstrates that the procedures employed by the trial court were correct.[4]

The route we must follow is not insensitive to the problem of safeguarding the rights of an accused from possible disingenuous assurances by the Government that it has done its duty of making available to the accused and the court all the illegal surveillance materials that are arguably relevant to the case. It recog-

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[2a]United States v. Mirro, 435 F.2d 839, 841 (*7th* Cir. 1970).

[3]"Nothing in Alderman . . . requires an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance." *Taglianetti, supra*, 394 U.S. at 317, 89 S.Ct. at 1101. See *also Nolan v. United States*, 423 F.2d 1031, 1041-45 (10*th* Cir. 1970).

[4]*See U.S. v. Clay*, 430 F.2d 165, 169 (5*th* Cir. 1970), *rev.* on other grounds, ... U.S. ...., 91 S.Ct. 2068, ... L.Ed.2d .... (1971).

nizes that there are many means by which a Government agent committed to devious conduct may try to enshroud his illegal actions from even the most vigilant accused. For instance, the tapes could be erased and the logs burned, as soon as all relevant information had been gleaned from them. However, the balance has been struck on broader interests. The accused cannot be granted the right to rummage through the Government's files, *Taglianetti, supra*: We view the *Alderman* limits as seeking to strike a just balance between the right of a defendant to eliminate tainted evidence from his trial process with the due preservation of the right of the people to deter criminal conduct. The Court's solution is to leave to the integrity of the trial judge the duty to decide *in camera* only issues relating to standing and to throw open to the light of adversary procedures *all* issues as to relevance of evidence which his informed judgment tells him the defendant has a right to review. This is the procedure designed to accord both the defendant and the people the best protections possible.

b. Production of Records

The same problem of prosecutorial good faith discussed above arises with respect to the defendants' request for surveillance notes and airtels. The trial judge required the FBI to search its files to determine whether they contained any tainted information. The argument of the defendants that this was improper necessarily asserts that they should have been allowed to search through the complete Government files which were or might have been used as a basis for investigating and prosecuting this case. This procedure has not only been negated in *Taglianetti* but also in *Alderman* when the Supreme Court held that the scope of the hearing "must be left to the informed discretion, good

sense, and fairness of the trial judge." 394 U.S. at 185, 89 S.Ct. at 973. We do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion in defining the limits of the inquiry in this case. He was in a better position than we to judge the extent of the illegal evidence and to make a determination as to whether or not further inquiry was needed to discover any extant but unrevealed illegal evidence. In other words, the trial judge was in the best position to get a "feel" for the case in terms of defining the scope of the hearing. The trial judge could properly take into account the ample opportunity the defendants had to probe the source of those items of evidence offered to convict them and the plausibility of the Government's account of the independent source for every such aspect of the evidence. *See Baker v. United States,* 430 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

The 7th Circuit is in agreement with our conclusion. *United States v. Hoffa,* 436 F.2d 1243 (7*th* Cir. 1970). Hoffa argued that the trial court erred in denying the production of similar airtels. The 7th Circuit held that although *Alderman* required all surveillance records to which a defendant has standing be turned over to him without *in camera* screening, disclosure was limited to those materials only. It was further determined that the district court acted within the ambit of its discretion in ruling that the defendant neither needed nor was entitled to anything more than the specified conversations which were produced and examined.

Defendants have called to our attention the recent case of *United States v. Alderisio,* 424 F.2d 20 (10*th* Cir. 1970). Prior to the hearing, the Government turned over to Alderisio all logs to which he had *Alderman* standing. In addition, the Government furnished to Alderisio some airtel summaries of original logs

which contained conversations not noted or transcribed in the corresponding logs. Alderisio argued that these airtels showed the Government's asserted disclosure of complete records (logs, airtel excerpts, and one complete airtel) did not satisfy the *Alderman* disclosure requirement. A defense request for amplified scrutiny of FBI files was denied by the district court. The 10th Circuit did order the cause remanded, but only for the limited purpose of requiring the court to make an *in camera* comparison of all airtels with the relevant logs to determine if the Government had disclosed all extant surveillance materials. The appellate court did not order that any additional surveillance material be made available to the defendant. Rather, the rationale of *Alderisio* is that the issue of "completeness" should be decided by the court *in camera* and only in the event that the district court should hold that the Government had failed to fully disclose, could the defendant obtain and review the undisclosed airtels and logs for relevancy. There is no issue of "completeness" in the case at bar. Our holding is that the district judge should rule on questions of standing *in camera* before the defendants are allowed to determine relevancy. Thus it appears that the *Alderisio* case supports rather than detracts from the vitality of our holding.[4a]

We conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of the hearing both as to production of the logs in question and the airtels and surveillance notes. We have reviewed the finding of the district court that the convictions were not tainted by illegal evidence and determine that finding to be clearly correct. In addition, we agree with the district court that it had no jurisdiction to consider motions for new trial. Such consideration would have been contrary to the

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[4a] *See,* Mirro, *supra n.* 2a at 841.

limited purposes of the remand mandate. Finally, the defendant Kane argues that the trial judge erred in not requiring a pre-sentence report to be submitted prior to the entry of sentence. On this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion. *See United States v. Hutul,* 416 F.2d 607 627 (7*th* Cir. 1969); *King v. United States,* 410 F.2d 1127 (9*th* Cir. 1969). No prejudice can be shown since the trial judge heard evidence as to all of the mitigating circumstances. Then too it must be noted that even the present sentences are not beyond correction or reduction. *See* Fed.R.Crim. P. 35.

THE SEVEN ORIGINAL ISSUES

In the original appeal, defendants raised the seven issues set out and numbered in the margin.[5] On the

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[5]1. It was error to receive in evidence the tape recordings of the conversations overheard by the Bubis wiretap.

2. The Wall testimony, being entirely dependent upon an identification made through the Bubis tapes, was thus tained by the illegal wiretap and should have been excluded, as should, consequently, all of the credit card evidence of which the Wall testimony was the cornerstone.

3. The Hanna search warrant was admittedly based on information from the illicit Hanna wiretap, so that the receipt in evidence of the material seized under that warrant was error.

4. The warrants for all the other coordinated Miami searches were based on information from the Hanna wiretap and the illegal Rosenthal bug, so that the receipt in evidence of the material seized under all of the said warrants was error.

5. Assuming arguendo that the record does not disclose such taint of the evidence by illegal eavesdropping as to require reversal of the convictions, reversal is nevertheless required because of the erroneous restrictions imposed on pretrial and voir dire inquiry into the government's illegalities.

6. The FBI's four hours of telephone answering in one of the raided premises was an unconstitutional search, so that it was error to receive the testimony of Agent Scranton as to the contents of the communications taken through that search.

7. The government's charts purportedly summarizing the evidence were improper under this Court's standards and should have been excluded from evidence.

present appeal, the court has only heard arguments of counsel on the *Alderman* issue, discussed above, and on the newly raised issues discussed in the final section of our opinion here. As to the issues presented on the former appeal, we have determined that oral argument is not necessary.[6] Our discussion of the *Alderman* hearing is dispositive of Issue 5 and the question of the Rosenthal bug in Issue 4. Issues 1-4 are concerned with the so-called Hanna and Bubis tapes. These tape recordings came into existence when two different telephone companies tapped into two telephone lines which they had reason to believe were being used fraudulently. A description of the circumstances under which the Hanna recordings were made and the establishment of their legality is contained in *Hanna v. United States,* 404 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968). Based upon this precedent, Issue 3 and the remainder of Issue 4 are without merit. However, Issues 1 and 2, involving the admissibility of the Bubis tapes themselves and testimony dependent upon evidence obtained from such tapes, call for some discussion. The 9th Circuit in *Bubis v. United States,* 384 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1967) ordered the use of these tapes suppressed in the trial of Bubis on the ground that they covered three months of wiretapping by the telephone company and that this period constituted such an unreasonable amount of time for the telephone company to ascertain whether or not Bubis was making long distance calls without paying the tolls, that its use in a criminal proceeding could not be condoned. It does not follow, however, that the portion of these same tapes introduced in the instant trial should have been suppressed. Assuming, without de-

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[6]Rule 18, 5th Cir.; *see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of N.Y., et al.,* 431 F.2d 409, Part I (5th Cir. 1970).

ciding for this Circuit, that we would hold three months to be such an unreasonable amount of time for a private company to monitor equipment it believed was being misused and that we would bar the use of such monitoring in a criminal case, we decline to hold that all use of the tapes so obtained would be proscribed. Only the first four days of the Bubis wiretapping was utilized in the trial below. Certainly it would be inconsistent to assert that the court must refuse to consider evidence gathered in four days of wiretapping as unreasonably intrusive and at the same time hold, as we did, that six weeks was not an unreasonable period for the company to monitor Hanna's telephone. We limit our ruling here to holding that without regard to whether the subsequent activities in Bubis' case were reasonable, such subsequent wiretapping does not preclude use of the tapes recorded during the first four days of that period. In addition, it should be borne in mind that we consider the issue as it relates to the defendants here and not to Bubis himself because, at best, these defendants possess doubtful standing to protest to the unreasonableness of the wiretapping since only the voice of the non-appealing defendant, Beckley, was overheard in the four-day period used here.[7] We conclude that it was not error to admit the Bubis tapes as against these defendants.

Issue 6 asserts that the action of an FBI agent in answering the telephone on one of the raided premises and posing as a bookie constitutes a search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and violates 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (1962). The agent was properly on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant. Gambling paraphernalia described in the warrant was seized and defendant Sklaroff was arrested. However, for four hours

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[7] *See* Alderman, *supra*, Part I, 394 U.S. at 171-173.

following the raid the agent answered the telephone, taking bets and dispensing gambling information. At trial he was allowed to testify as to the contents of the calls.

United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7*th* Cir. 1964) is dispositive of the statutory point, and we deem further discussion unnecessary. The constitutional question, however, is not so easy. *Pasha* appears to be the only case dealing with the issue that is squarely in point on the facts. In summary fashion, *Pasha* relied exclusively upon the holding in *Olmstead v. United States,* 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) that "telephone conversations intercepted by police officers were not protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution." 332 F.2d at 197. The holding in *Olmstead* has, of course, been overruled by *Katz v. United States,* 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967). *Katz* does not, however, necessarily control this case. The thrust of *Katz* was to dispel the notion that in order for Fourth Amendment guarantees to arise there must be a trespass upon a constitutionally protected area. It emphasized that a person's expectation of privacy is the compelling consideration. Unlike *Katz,* the defendants here were not being overheard. Therefore, they could not have had an expectation of privacy as to a conversation in which they did not participate. In addition it is important to note that the agent never impersonated the defendants, and the testimony does not show that any caller was under the misapprehension that he was speaking to one of the defendants. The defendants cannot claim someone else's right of privacy.

The evidence gleaned from the telephone calls is analogous to the seizure of evidence not described in a search warrant. Evidence not described in a valid

search warrant but having a nexus with the crime under investigation may be seized at the same time the described evidence is seized. *Bryant v. United States,* 252 F.2d 746 (5*th* Cir. 1958); *United States v. Bridges,* 419 F.2d 963 (8*th* Cir. 1969); *Johnson v. United States,* 293 F.2d 539 (D.C.Cir. 1961). The test is whether the agent had probable cause to "believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." *Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,* 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1650, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). Of course the warrant here could not have described any words to be seized from telephone calls that had not yet been made, but, with equal certainty, an agent in these circumstances has probable cause to believe that other evidence of gambling could be obtained by answering a ringing telephone in premises that had already yielded warrant authorized evidence of gambling. We should not be understood as holding this was not a form of search which must be tested by Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. What we find is that under these circumstances this search did not exceed those standards. The officer had a duty to gather and preserve this contemporaneous evidence of criminal activity occurring in his presence. If a number of the calls had been innocent calls or if the search had been conducted for a prolonged period of time, then the standards of reasonableness could be transgressed. But the record before us shows the agent received no innocent calls; rather, all of the 53 calls received during the four-hour period concerned gambling. One further caveat is appropriate. We in nowise intend to trench upon the rule which holds that in every search an officer should obtain a warrant as soon as practicable. We simply cannot fault the police conduct disclosed here.

In Issue 7 the defendants concern themselves with charts prepared by the Government purporting to summarize the evidence and argue that these charts should have been excluded. We disagree. The charts were based upon competent evidence already before the jury, and the primary evidence utilized to construct the charts was available to the defendants for comparison in order that the correctness of the summary could be tested. In addition the agent who prepared the charts was available for cross-examination. Finally the jury was given correct instructions concerning their consideration of the charts. *See Gordon v. United States,* 438 F.2d 858, 876-77 (5*th* Cir. 1971). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing these charts into evidence. *See Baines v. United States,* 426 F.2d 833 (5*th* Cir. 1970); *McDaniel v. United States,* 343 F.2d 785 (5*th* Cir. 1965).

THE NEW ISSUES

While normally we might not permit new matters to be considered on the return of a remanded cause, especially matters which could cause prejudice by delay in their assertion, we deem it more appropriate to dispose of those raised here on their merits rather than to hold that they come too late. On this appeal, the defendants contend for the first time that a portion of the evidence admitted at trial eventuated from a search warrant issued upon probable cause that the Wagering Tax Act was being violated. This Act, of course, was found to be fatally defective on Fifth Amendment grounds. *Marchetti v. United States,* 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and *Grosso v. United States,* 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968). The defendants thus argue that *Marchetti-Grosso* vitiates this search warrant and precludes the introduction of any evidence gained there-

from. This contention was decided adversely to the defendants in *United States v. Scaglione,* ..... F.2d .... (5*th* Cir. 1971) [No. 29279 July 9, 1971].

The last additional point of error urged by the defendants pertains to the admission of the defendants' income tax returns in order to show that their major source of income was gambling. Included in the returns was a deduction for a wagering tax stamp which was couched in these words: "Stamp tax license." Defendants argue that the purchase of the stamp described was compelled in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights under the *Marchetti-Grosso* rationale, and thus the returns which disclosed that they bought this stamp should not have been admitted. This contention is without merit. First of all, the stamp deduction was only one item on the complete return and it was never specifically brought to the attention of the jury. The only way the jury could have been apprised of the existence of the deduction was by reading the details in the returns. Even had the jury pursued this course, we cannot say they would have concluded that the defendants were thereby stating they were gamblers. Thus our case is distinguishable from *Nolan v. United States,* 395 F.2d 283 (5*th* Cir. 1968), relied upon so heavily by the defendants. In addition, these defendants certainly were not compelled to claim a deduction for the stamp. Their action in doing so was voluntary and was in no way compelled by law. Defendants are not constitutionally excused from any resulting prejudice.

The judgments of conviction are

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit.

In the United States Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit.

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Morton Paul Kane and Martin Sklaroff, Defendants-Appellants. No. 29200.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (Opinion Sept. 30, 1971, 5 Cir., 1971, ... F.2d .....).

(November 8, 1971)

Before BELL, THORNBERRY and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: The Petition for Rehearing on behalf of Morton Paul Kane is DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.

Morton Paul Kane, Gilbert Lee Beckley and Martin Sklaroff, Appellants, v. United States of America, Appellees. No. 24911.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. April 24, 1969.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; Ted Cabot, Judge.

E. David Rosen, Miami, Fla., Edward Bennett Williams, Harold Ungar, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Wallace H. Johnson, William G. Earle, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The appellants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 by conducting gambling-connected telephone communication between Miami, Florida, and Louisville, Kentucky, and of a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1084 and 1952. Beckley alone was convicted of § 1952 violations by telephone communication between Miami, Florida, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Miami, Florida, and New York City.

Reversal of the convictions is sought, among other reasons, because of the admission of evidence obtained in raids that was tainted because of illegal wiretaps and bugs.[1]

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[1] Under Rule 18 the Court has placed this case on the Summary Calendar for disposition without oral argument. *See* Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 5 Cir. 1969, 409 F.2d 804.

In view of the opinions of the Supreme Court in Alderman et al. v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, October Term, 1967, and related cases, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent therewith.

Order.

United States District Court, Southern District of Florida.

United States of America vs. Gilbert Lee Beckley, Morton Paul Kane, and Martin Sklaroff No. 66-196-CR-TC.

FILED: January 9, 1970.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit having vacated the judgment of this Court in the above-stated case on April 24, 1969, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with *Alderman v. United States,* 1969, 89 S. Ct. 961.

And this Court having conducted such proceedings and, after full hearing, entered its Order on December 1, 1969, denying defendants' motions and entering new final judgments of conviction,

And this Court, on December 17, 1969, having reimposed the same sentences on each of the above-named defendants as were imposed in this Court's original judgments and sentences of March 22, 1967, whereupon

A written motion for new trial was filed on December 17, 1969 in open Court on behalf of defendant Martin Sklaroff, in which defendants Gilbert Lee Beckley and Morton Paul Kane orally joined and hearing thereon having been held on December 23, 1969,

It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that said motion for new trial is overruled and denied as to each and every defendants.

The Court is of the opinion that the said motion for new trial is not within the purview of the limited purpose for which this case was remanded by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as expressed in its mandate.

DONE and ORDERED this 8 day of January, 1970, in Miami, Florida.

Ted Cabot
United States District Judge

cc: James J. Hogan, Esq.
E. David Rosen, Esq.
Dougald D. McMillan, Esq.

SUPREME COURT, U. S.
FILED
JAN 3 1972
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

No. 71-748

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

MORTON PAUL KANE, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

No. 71-748

MORTON PAUL KANE, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, petitioner and one Martin Sklaroff were convicted of having used interstate facilities to carry on an illegal gambling business, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1952, and of having conspired to violate that statute and 18 U.S.C. 1084 (prohibiting the transmission of wagers by a wire facility in interstate commerce), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Petitioner was given concurrent prison terms of five years on each count. The court of ap-

peals vacated the judgments and sentences and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of *Alderman* v. *United States*, 394 U.S. 165 (Pet. App. 18-19; 409 F. 2d 847). After a hearing on the question whether evidence was tainted by unlawful electronic surveillance, the district court held that the convictions were untainted and reimposed the original judgments and sentences. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 1-16).

Petitioner contends that the district court improperly restricted the taint hearings by refusing to require production to him of transcriptions of overheard conversations in which he was not shown to have participated but in which the identity of all participants was not known. Instead these overhearings were examined by the trial court *in camera*.[1] This contention is thoroughly answered in the opinion below which correctly points out that the taint hearing was conducted in accord with the requirements of *Alderman* v. *United States*, *supra*.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

JANUARY 1972.

[1] Sklaroff raises this same contention, among others, in his petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 71-724, to which we have filed a response.

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